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PAUL A. WERNER III
The silliness that follows upon a generalized right to anony-
inous speech has no end.'
- Justice Antonin Scalia
Anything mean and nasty you can do in politics on the
streets, you can do on the Internet. The only difference is,
on the Internet, nobody sees your faCe-
2
- Phil Noble, President-of Politics Online
I. Introduction
On the eve of the election you jack3 into the Net 4 to
gauge what other Americans-ordinary citizens just
like you-are thinking about your candidate. You
navigate the ether of cyberspace until you land in one
of your favorite political chat rooms. The debate inside
is white hot and is mirrored by the cool glow radiating
from your computer screen...
Before long you are locked in dialogue with
"campaign-insider," a woman who claims to volunteer
for one of the campaigns. It so happens that it is the
campaign of the candidate for whom you plan on voting.
When you convey this fact to her, the conversation
suddenly bends in a new direction. She confesses that
there just may be some things that you should know
about your candidate. The candidate's racist views
and ties to hate groups, it seems, are open but closely
guarded secrets. Remarkably, other participants in the
discussion-whom you had all but ignored up to this
point-start immediately to confirm campaign-insider's
allegation. Each of them has a frightening anecdote
to share with you.
All of this is news to you, and rather unbelievable.
But it is made more credible with each successiVe
confirmation. As each new revelation shades into and
envelops previous ones, campaign-insider's simple
confession resolves into a dark and seemingly undeni-
able truth. There is something affirming and power-
ful about the consensus emerging before your eyes.
How could so many people be wrong? And, after
all, this wouldn't be the first political scandal broken
onlineS...On your way to work the next day you stop by
the local polling place, step into the makeshift booth,
and vote your conscience...
What you don't know-and will never learn-is
that campaign-insider actually works for the candidate
you initially disfavored, but who ended up getting
your vote. So, too, do all the other discussion partici-
pants who validated what campaign-insider told you.
Last night they were all sitting together in the same
room at the campaign's headquarters trying to convert
keystrokes into a few more votes...
This narrative is not true. But it is not quite fictional
either.6 It depicts one of the very real problems created
by the convergence of the Internet and electioneering.7
The role for the Internet in our electoral process can
no longer be speculated.8 It has emerged as a potent
political tool, 9 for electioneers'0 as well as ordinary
citizens.1" Campaigns are increasingly relying on
the Internet to raise money," influence voters, 3 and
mobilize supporters.' 4 At least one candidate's victory
has been attributed directly to his use of the Internet.1
5
And they are not alone in cyberspace either. Ordinary
Americans-you and me-are also jacking into the
Net with politics in mind.'6 An increasing number of us
are going online to learn about candidates, 7 contribute
to campaigns, 8 and, importantly, to exchange views
in online political discussion fora' 9 (e.g., chat rooms,
messages boards, Usenet groups, and e-mail lists).2"
This convergence of the Internet and our electoral
process is raising some interesting problems for the
Federal Election Commission ("FEC"), 2' the agency
charged with administering the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act ("FECA"). 22 For example, how do (or should)
rules conceived with the operative logic of traditional
mass media in mind (e.g., television, radio, and print)
apply to a mass medium that operates according to
fundamentally different principles? 23 After nearly two
years since it first invited public comment on the use of
the Internet for campaign activity,24 the FEC has now
issued proposed rules to clarify the legal implications of
some of that activity."5 The proposed rules, however,
represent only regulatory quick fixes for some specific
problems2 6 and do not scratch the surface of a larger
fundamental question raised by the incipience of the
Internet as a political tool. How do we facilitate greater
participation in our electoral process through Internet
use while simultaneously maintaining the integrity of
that very process?
This Note discusses an aspect of this fundamental
question in the context of one provision of the FECA.
27
The FECA's identification requirement, section 441d,
prohibits anonymous communications via mass media
when any person makes an expenditure 28 for the pur-
pose of financing communications expressly advocating
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the election or defeat of clearly identified 29 candidates.30
The mass media included are broadcast, print, direct
mail, outdoor advertsing facilities, and any other gen-
eral public political advertising.3 Communications
triggering this provision must contain clear informa-
tion identifying who paid for and who authorized
them.32 The statute delineates three possible required
disclosures: (1) that the communication has been paid
for and authorized by a candidate, her political com-
mittee, or its agents; 33 (2) that the communication has
been authorized by a candidate, her political commit-
tee, or its agents but paid for by a third party and
that party's name; 34 or (3) that the communication
has not been authorized by a candidate, her political
committee, or its agents and has been paid for by a
third party and that party's name."
The question addressed by this Note is whether
similar political communications on the Internet should
be subject to an identification requirement modeled
on section 441d. This question is complicated by the
idiosyncratic architectural and economic characteristics
of the Internet.36 The Internet affords ordinary people
greater opportunities for participation in our electoral
process by facilitating inexpensive mass communica-
tion: 37 speech is cheap on the Net.38 As the Supreme
Court has told us, "through the use of chat rooms,
any person with a phone line can become a town
crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could
from any soapbox." 39 But because the Internet also
affords speakers an unprecedented ability to com-
municate anonymously 4 -long viewed as a mixed
blessing 4 -there is good reason to fear that schemes
such as the one described above will infect the pro-
cess itself.42 Although it will be ultimately Congress's
responsibility to address this problem, the FEC so far
seems to be heading us down a misguided path toward
solving it.
43
This Note advocates the need for and constitutional-
ity of a regulation modeled on the FECA's identification
requirement restricting election-related anonymous
speech on the Internet, particularly in online discussion
fora. Section II explicates the governmental interests
advanced by the FECA's identification requirement.
This Section explains that the principal interest in
curbing so-called "dirty tricks"44 served by section
441d at least intuitively justifies a regulation which
imposes similar restrictions on analogous communica-
tions transpiring online. Section III takes this argument
a step further by demonstrating that the Internet is
capable of, and is in fact, being used to perpetrate a
breed of "dirty tricks" similar to those which motivated
enactment of the FECA's identification requirement in
the first place. This Section argues that the ways in
which Internet savvy market manipulators and consult-
ing firms are using online discussion fora provide tell-
ing analogues for behavior we should expect, and are
beginning to find, from equally savvy electioneers.
Section IV addresses the First Amendment free
speech concerns raised by governmental interferences
with anonymous speech. This Section first briefly
sketches the constitutional policies brought-into conflict
by regulations restricting election-related anonymous
speech. This Section then provides a descriptive
review of the Court's decisions involving restrictions on
anonymous speech. This Section next argues that the
conceptual methodology that the Court has devised
to assess inadvertent 45 regulatory interferences with
free expression provides a vital way for the Court to
bring clarity to its muddled anonymous speech doc-
trine. Lastly, this Section demonstrates that the Court's
analytical approach to these cases has been guided, at
least implicitly, by this methodology all along.
Section V applies this methodology to the hypotheti-
cal case of an appropriately worded regulation modeled
on section 441d that restricts anonymous election-
related communications in online discussion fora. This
Section concludes that under this methodology such a
regulation should pass constitutional muster.
THI Sconvergence of the Internet and our
THIelectoral process is raising some interesting
problems for the Federal Election Commission ("FEC"), the
agency charged with administering the Federal Election
Campaign Act ("FECA"). For example, how do (or should)
rules conceived with the operative logic of traditional mass
media in mind (e.g., television, radio, and print) apply to
a mass medium that operates according to fundamentally
different principles?
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II. Are the Governmental Interests
Advanced by the FECA's Identification
Requirement Germane to Online Elec-
tioneering?
The initial step in determining the propriety of a
regulation which extends the restrictions imposed by
section 441d to electioneering on the Internet involves
an evaluation of the governmental interests served by
that section. To the extent that real and virtual world
electioneering practices manifest the same concerns
section 441d is designed to address, an extension of
that section's restrictions to encompass online com-
munications seems logical. But the converse is equally
true: if real world election-
eering raises concerns inap-
posite to its virtual counter- ON close inspi
part, imposing section 441d's IN 44ldis not
identification requirements oftheir messages. The pa
on online election-related
communications makes little cyber-electioneering than
sense. On close inspection,
it becomes clear that the governmental interest served
by section 441d is not dependent on the specific media
chosen by electioneers for communication of their
messages.46 The policy interest undergirding that
section may in fact prove more relevant to cyber-
electioneering than electioneering via conventional
mass media.47
A. The Governmental Interests Advanced by the
FECA's Identification Requirement Offline
Section 441d stands as a rather singular provision within
the FECA's complicated network of spending limits
and required disclosures.48 The FECA was principally
enacted to serve the government's interest in ensur-
ing rational electoral outcomes by stemming financial
corruption and its appearance in federal politics.
49
This objective is advanced directly5 ° by limitations
placed on campaign contributions and expenditures."
The Act's disclosure requirements5 2 serve interests
complementary to but also independent from those
advanced by the spending limits.53 First, they advance
the government's interest in providing the electorate
with information-namely, the sources of candidates'
financial support-necessary for evaluating candidates
for federal office.54 Secondly, they deter (actual or
apparent) corrupt uses of money before or after elec-
tions by exposing the sources of large contributions
and expenditures to the "light of publicity."55 Lastly,
they serve the ancillary function of enabling detection
of violators of the Act's spending limits.
56
Section 441d plainly serves interests similar to those
advanced by the other provisions that make up the
FECA's matrix of required disclosures. 57 Because mass
media communications (prior to the advent of the
Internet) involve substantial expenditures, mandated
identification of the entity or individual paying for such
communications advances the government's interest
in reducing the corrupting influence of "big money"
in federal elections.58 Requiring individuals or entities
behind mass media communications to reveal their
ection, it becomes clear that the governmental interest served by section
dependent on the specific media chosen by electioneers for communication
licy interest undergirding that section may in fact prove more relevant to
electioneering via conventional mass media.
identities likewise advances the objective of providing
"additional information to the voting public."5 9 But
the FECA's identification requirement also serves the
peculiar interest of eradicating so-called "dirty tricks"6"
in federal politics not represented by any of the Act's
other requirements.6'
Enacted in the wake of the Watergate break-in and
its concomitant socio-political fallout, section 441d
is deeply informed by the ethos of that time.62 The
dirty trick escapades of the 1972 presidential election
exposed during the Watergate hearings provided the
impetus for legislative action. 63 The Watergate inves-
tigations uncovered political chicanery that stretched
along a continuum from the comical to the obscene:
bogus press releases purportedly authored by an oppos-
ing candidate were issues with the intent of misrep-
resenting him and misleading the public; 64 spurious
telegrams were sent bearing the names of opposing
parties; 65 a letter accusing opposing candidates of
"deviancy" was circulated; 6 6 and an elaborate deception
documenting a connection between the late President
Kennedy and the assassination of President Diem of
South Vietnam was carried out.
67
The legislative history of section 441d is undoubt-
edly scant, 68 but it demonstrates that the provision
was intended to serve as a political "truth in advertis-
ing" imperative to curb "sharp practices."69 When
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introducing a provision similar to section 441d during
the Senate debates on the 1974 amendments to the
FECA,70 Sen. Talmadge commented that dirty tricks
subvert the sacrosanct right to vote. 7' Talmadge's
amendment was ultimately rejected,72 but an analogous
provision was enacted in its stead.73 During the next
Congress, that amendment was removed from the
criminal code' and joined by section 441d.75 What
discussion there was of section 441d echoed the sen-
timents fuelling adoption of the earlier provision.76
Indeed, the language of all three provisions confirms
that each of them reflects the same concern for the ill
effects of dirty tricks on our electoral process.77
B. The Governmental Interests Advanced by the
FECA's Identification Requirement Online
If the FECA served the sole purpose of reducing the cor-
rupt use of money in federal politics, extending require-
ments like those imposed by section 441d to online
election-related communications would be absurd. This
view of the FECA requires understanding section 441d
as reflecting an assumption about the nature of mass
media: communicating via mass media is expensive.78
But the Internet lacks the characteristics of conventional
mass media on which that assumption is based.79 It
is at this point axiomatic that the architecture of the
Internet makes it uniquely suited for inexpensive mass
communication.80 The Internet is a decentralized,
user-controlled, interactive, and abundant 8 medium.82
It can accommodate an unlimited number of speakers83
and is devoid of the traditional gatekeepers controlling
access to limited distribution channels that is the sin qua
non of traditional mass media.8 4 Thus, if section 441d
were meant only to advance the government's interest
in stemming corruption and its appearance,85 it would
obviously be inappropriate to extend its restrictions
to touch online communications.
By contrast, if the FECA's disclosure requirements are
to be understood as serving the discrete governmental
interest in providing the electorate with more informa-
tion on candidates and the interests they represent,86
imposing restrictions similar to those of section 441d
on Internet communications seems reasonable. It is
beyond question that a political communication that
identifies its speaker (no matter the medium) provides
more information to its reader, viewer, or listener than
one that does not.87 However, if the disclosure pro-
visions are meant only to further the creation of a
transparent campaign finance regime by informing the
electorate of where political money comes from and
how candidates spend it,8 8 then, once again, transport-
ing the requirements of section 441d into cyberspace
makes little sense. Because Internet communications
involve trivial costs, 9 knowing the identities of those
sending political communications across cyberspace
would neither inform voters of the major sources of a
candidate's financial support nor alert them to the inter-
ests that the candidate would likely serve if elected.90
However, the legislative history and language of
section 441d demonstrate that it is designed principally
to advance an interest distinct from the FECA's other
requirements. 9' And in so far as section 441d is aimed
at curbing dirty tricks in electoral politics, 92 bringing
a similar regulation to bear on Internet communica-
tions seems entirely reasonable from a policy stand-
point. Political machinations can be perpetrated via
any medium; the Internet is no exception. 93 In fact, the
economics and architecture of the Internet 94 make it
uniquely suitable for launching dirty trick campaigns.
95
Thus, if the Internet is the greatest tool for political
change since the Guttenburg press,96 we should be
especially concerned about schemes analogous to those
uncovered by the Watergate hearings 97 cropping up
in cyberspace. 98
Ill. Dirty Tricks and the Internet:
Real Harms in a Virtual World?
Dirty tricks in politics have not disappeared into the
pages of history along with memory of the Watergate
scandal. 99 It does seem, however, that section 441d
has forced the perpetrators
of such schemes to use sub-
optimal modes of communi-
cation.1'0 This is likely to
change if requirements simi-
lar to those of section 441d
are not imposed on online
election-related communica-
N DIr in so far as section 441d is aimed at curbing dirty tricks in electoral politics,A NIbringing a similar regulation to bear on Internet communications seems
entirely reasonable from a policy standpoint. Political machinations can be perpetrated via any
medium; the Internet is no exception. In fact, the economics and architecture of the Internet make
it uniquely suitable for launching dirty trick campaigns.
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tions.'0 In answering the question begged by the
preceding one, °2 this Section suggests some of the
ways in which the Internet can play host to the same
types of dirty tricks that inspired the enactment of
section 441d. How stock market manipulators and
business consulting companies use online discussion
fora-and the anonymity afforded by them-provides
a preview of behavior we should expect (and seem to be
finding) from unscrupulous electioneers unconstrained
by requirements similar to those imposed by section
441d.
The incipience of the Internet has breathed new life
into the old-time phenomenon of market manipula-
tion.'0 3 The ease of disseminating information to an
untold number 1 4 of investors via online discussion fora
dedicated to the sharing of investment information has
spawned a new breed of stock market manipulation.0 5
In its most simple manifestation, a market manipulator
may disguise her true identity by anonymity or false
pretense."' For example, a short-term investor in a
company's stock can artificially hype the stock by
posing as a company insider and posting inaccurate
information about the company. 7 The manipulator
thereby attempts to influence the stock price by leverag-
ing false information against the credibility that she
gains as a purported insider.'0 8 There is anecdotal
evidence to suggest that such simple deceptions have
achieved their desired effects. 9 Illustrative is the
case of La Jolla Golf's CEO, Steve Cade, who recently
posted an apology on Yahoo! for bashing a rival company
on online investment message boards."0 Cade used
twenty-seven aliases to post one hundred and sixty-
three messages warning the company's shareholders that
it had "lost the ability to design new technology" and to
"get out before the next down tick occurs.""' Interest-
ingly, Cade held short positions in the company's stock
and during the period of his campaign' 12 against the
company its stock price fell over fifty percent.'
13
Market manipulators have devised an even more
potent methodology for influencing stock prices by
putting a twenty-first century twist on the well-worn" 4
"pump and dump" technique." 5 Manipulators using
this scheme post messages in rapid succession, all of
which affirm the same rumor or prediction."6 Whether
carried out in concert with others, or masterminded
by a single manipulator using various aliases," 7 the
purpose of such deceptions is to ignite an artificial spark
of interest in a stock that spreads like wildfire to invest-
ment discussion fora across cyberspace and culminates
by influencing the stock's price."8 There have in
fact been infamous" 9 instances in which manipula-
tors deploying this type of scheme have dramatically
affected the prices of target stocks. 12 Consider, for
example, the case of thirteen-year-old Jonathan Lebed
who became the first minor charged with fraud by the
Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC"). 121 Lebed's
niodus operandi involved buying large blocks of thinly
traded low-priced stocks which he would then tout
at investment chat rooms online. 2 2 He used various
aliases to post hundreds of messages such as, "the most
undervalued stock ever," to create a false impression
of widespread interest in the stocks he held.123 Once
the stocks' prices increased to reflect the artificial
buzz generated by his postings, Lebed would quickly
dump his shares.' 24 He earned about $800,000 using
this scheme before forced by the SEC to disgorge
$285,000.125 Despite the headline grabbing peculiari-
ties of Lebed's case, its underlying facts are far from
unique.
26
The most elaborate of the market manipulation
schemes facilitated by online investment discussion
fora has been aptly described as the "infobomb." 1
27
Manipulators using this technique take the online
version of the "pump and dump" scam one step fur-
ther 128 by backing up the rumors or predictions they
spread with fabricated company reports, 129 bogus press
releases,130 or even links to simulated pages of legitimate
online news sources. 31 Infobombers thereby attempt
to fashion even more convincing illusions than those
achieved through use of the pump and dump method
by masking their assertions with an even thicker veneer
of legitimacy.3 2 Market manipulators using this tactic
have again been able to significantly influence the prices
of target stocks.'33 An infobomb dropped on Emulex
drove its stock price down forty-five dollars in less than
an hour, costing individual shareholders upwards of
fifty million dollars.'34 Behind the precipitous decline of
Emulex's stock was a phony press release asserting that
the company's CEO was resigning amid an accounting
scandal. 3 5 By contrast, PairGain Technologies' stock
price enjoyed an opposite fate when an infobomber
constructed a simulated page of a legitimate news
source site that announced a takeover bid for the com-
pany.3 6 The webpage containing the announcement
was then linked to messages posted on financial mes-
sage boards.'37
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The visibility and magnitude of harms wrought by
market manipulators make them deserving of greater
attention; but they are not alone in using Internet
discussion fora to advance pecuniary interests. 3 8 Con-
sulting firms have also begun to co-opt online discus-
TE constitutionality of restrictions on
THelection-related anonymous speech is
an unsettled question. The answer becomes even less
clear when computers mediate the speech at issue, i.e.,
when speech happens on the Net.
sion fora to advance their business clients' interests.
39
Although online discussions may involve only a few
hundred participants, media commentators, corporate
marketing analysts, and government policymakers
increasingly perceive such groups as a "proxy for main-
stream opinion and a horizon for emerging trends."
40
Thus companies worried about how their images are
being shaped in chat rooms have begun to intervene by
employing consultants to "spin" online discussions in
their favor.'4' In fact, recent years have seen the birth
of consulting firms specializing in running Internet
advocacy campaigns 42 for their clients. 43 Mindshare
Internet Campaigns, for example, employs people to
adopt pseudonyms and participate in online discussions
on behalf of its clients. 44 Some firms go even further
by recruiting scientists and other experts to express
clients' perspectives in online fora. 45 The upshot of
consultants joining online discussions to voice their
clients' perspectives is debatable at this point, 46 but it is
clear that at least one consequence of this phenomenon
is that many discussion participants are beginning to
mistrust their interlocutors.' 47
It should not stretch the imagination 48 to conceive
of ways in which electioneers can assimilate these or
similar digital age tactics into their dirty trick arse-
nals.' 49 Electioneers unconstrained by any affirma-
tive duty to disclose their identities may quite easily
(and cheaply) orchestrate a boiler room operation that
involves staffers adopting false identities to undermine
an opposing candidate's credibility.' Anonymous
phone calls were similarly used to dash Steve Forbes'
presidential hopes in 1996.' 5' Is it too cynical to think
that Internet discussion fora will emerge as the locus in
quo for similar attacks in the future? In point of fact,
there have already been documented instances in which
similar new-age tactics have been deployed against
candidates for federal and state offices.
152
Electioneers may also appropriate the more potent
virtual pump and dump 15 and infobomb 154 methodolo-
gies to sabotage opponents' campaigns. Similar assaults
have been undertaken ofjline. 55 Despite the fact that
the Internet makes them radically easier to carry out
56
and their use by market manipulators suggests their
efficacy, 57 is there some reason to believe that such
attacks will not migrate online? On the contrary,
there is evidence to suggest that electioneers have
already begun to use these types of schemes. 58 Lastly,
electioneers may take the more sublte approach sug-
gested by consulting firms' use of online discussion
fora. 159 We may soon find political discussion fora
crowded with electioneers surreptitiously spinning
public opinion.
IV. Freedom of (Anonymous?) Speech
The constitutionality of restrictions on election-related
anonymous speech is an unsettled question. 60 The
answer becomes even less clear when computers medi-
ate the speech at issue, i.e., when speech happens
on the Net. This Section assesses the constitutional
scrutiny that any restriction on anonymous speech
would receive, including anonymous political speech
disseminated via the Internet. Part A of this Section
describes the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence
on regulations interfering with anonymous political
speech. Part B advances the normative view (in light of
the first) that the Court's approach in these cases is best
rationalized by bringing it in line with the conceptual
methodology used to assess inadvertent 6' interferences
with free speech. Part C demonstrates that the Court's
analytical approach to these cases has, it seems, been
informed by this methodology all along.
A. The View from Here: The Supreme Court's
Anonymous Speech Cases
The Court has had a difficult time calibrating its First
Amendment doctrine to election-related regulatory
interferences with anonymous speech. It has been
recognized that two significant interests tug the Court's
doctrine in opposite directions. 62 On the one hand lies
the deeply imbedded principle that the First Amend-
ment affords political speech nearly absolute protec-
tion. 63 The Court has steadfastly affirmed the First
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Amendment's paramount role in safeguarding robust
public debate.'64 Placed against the core value of
facilitating uninhibited debate, however, is the coun-
terbalancing interest of ensuring rational electoral
outcomes.'65 The Court has long understood that
voting is a systemic right inherent in our constitutional
structure166 and requires substantial regulation (includ-
ing interferences with speech) to produce fair and
honest results.'67 The task for the Court thus becomes
striking a balance between untrammeled political debate
and the practical restrictions necessary for ensuring
its efficacy.
Two landmark cases stand testament to the conflict-
ing constitutional policies guiding the Court in this
area and together represent the outer walls of the
crucible which tests regulations impinging election-
related anonymous speech. 68 Read expansively, Talley
v. California mandates broad protection for anonymous
speech in light of its historic pedigree.'69 Buckley v.
Valeo is poised at the opposite end of the spectrum.
Buckley affirms a government's pragmatic interest
in regulating its elections by upholding the FECA's
sweeping disclosure requirements for federal campaign
contributors.
70
At the intersection of these two cases, and the
interests they defend, lies a third. McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Conmnission represents the Court's attempt to
navigate the waters between the Scylla and Charybdis
of Talley and Buckley' 71 McIntyre addressed squarely
the constitutionality of a ban on anonymous election-
related speech.'72 Although McIntyre involved anony-
mous speech offline, it has far reaching implications
for regulations of anonymous campaign speech online.
Taken together, these three cases represent the con-
stitutional backdrop against which any restriction
imposed on election-related anonymous speech must
be assessed.
I. Talley v. California:
The Importance of Being Anonymous?
Talley represents the Court's seminal attempt to shep-
herd anonymous speech into the folds of its First
Amendment jurisprudence.'73 Talley was convicted and
fined ten dollars for violating a Los Angeles ordinance
prohibiting the distribution of anonymous handbills. 74
The ordinance required handbills distributed "in any
place under any circumstances" to bear on their face
the name and address of their author or printer and
distributor.'75
Although the Court struck the law as void on its
face, 76 its opinion failed to bring much light to this dim
corner of free speech doctrine. The Court's decision
is driven by the breathtaking scope of the ordinance
and its holding is razor thin. The Court held only that
laws barring anonymous leafleting wholesale violate
the First Amendment.'77 And its analysis gave little
direction to lawmakers and future litigants.
The Court's analytic schizophrenia left everyone
to guess at the appropriate level of protection afforded
anonymous speech by the First Amendment. The
Court explicitly left open the possibility that a more
limited ordinance (e.g., one aimed at preventing fraud,
false advertising, or libel) would survive constitutional
scrutiny.78 But it also seemed to foreclose that same
possibility by underscoring the anointed place anony-
mous speech holds in America's revolutionary his-
tory. Justice Black, writing for the majority, stated that
anonymous speech has been pressed into service for
"the most constructive purposes." 7 9
The upshot of Talley was that the Court left unan-
swered where the tipping point lies for determining
the constitutionality of interferences with anonymous
speech. The Court's obiter dicta suggest that the right
to anonymity is a core value inhering in the First
Amendment's speech clause and is thus entitled to
absolute protection. Yet the Court (purportedly)
limited its decision to passing on the validity of the
expansive ordinance under review; it left for another
day the case of a less intrusive regulation.
2. Buckley v. Valeo:
Does Money Talk Differently?
The Buckley Court cabined Talley's far-reaching implica-
tions by following its narrow holding rather than its
expansive rhetoric. 80 The relevant portions of Buckley
upheld the FECA's reporting and disclosure provisions
against a Talley-based challenge. 8' The provisions
imposed substantial obligations on political commit-
tees, 82 candidates, and individuals or groups making
independent 83 contributions or expenditures.'84 The
Act required political committees to register with the
FEC and maintain detailed records of their contributions
and expenditures. 8 5 The records needed to include
the date each contribution was received, its amount,
and the contributor's identity'86 and were subject to
FEC auditing and investigation. 87 Committees and
candidates were also required to report quarterly the
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name, address, occupation, and principal place of busi-
ness of each person contributing over one hundred
dollars.'88 These reports were to be made available "for
public inspection and copying."189 Candidates were
under the additional burden of designating a principal
campaign committee to compile and file with the FEC
the reports of all committees receiving contributions
and making expenditures on behalf of the candidate.' 90
Individuals and groups making contributions or expen-
ditures exceeding one hundred dollars in a calendar
year were likewise required to file statements with the
FEC.'9' The Act provided for the imposition of serious
penalties 92 for violations of these provisions.93
Despite the burden the FECA's requirements placed
on speech, the Court held that they did not run afoul
of the First Amendment.'94 The Court determined
that under its so-called "exacting" scrutiny the provi-
sions bore a substantial (rather than merely rational)
UN FORTUNATE
the Court's last encounter with a restriction interfering with anonymous
instructive than its first more than thirty years earlier. As the dissent emp
establish a clear legal rule to govern its protection of anonymous speed
relation to the governmental interests to be served and
information to be disclosed. 195 The Court recog-
nized that the FECA's disclosure requirements car-
ried the consequence of deterring some individuals
from speaking (i.e., spending money to promote politi-
cal objectives) or exposing them to harassment or
retaliation. 9 6 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that
the government's substantial regulatory objectives out-
weighed the restraints they imposed on an individual's
interest in free speech.'97
The Court delineated three governmental objectives
that justified the FECA's interference with free speech.
First, the Court validated the government's interest in
providing the electorate with information necessary
for evaluating candidates for federal office.'98 The
Court reasoned that knowing where campaign money
comes from and how candidates spend it enables voters
to place candidates more precisely along the politi-
cal spectrum and gain a realistic perspective on the
interests they will serve if elected.' 99 The Court thus
implicitly accepted a decrease in the amount of speech
entering the marketplace for a commensurate improve-
ment in its fidelity.200 Secondly, the Court approved
of the government's interest in deterring corruption
and its appearance."' The Court realized that expos-
ing contributions and expenditures to the "light of
publicity" would discourage quid pro quo politics and
the corrupt use of money to affect elections.20 2 Lastly,
the Court acknowledged the government's interest in
facilitating enforcement of the FECA's contribution
limitations. 0 3 The Court stated that the recordkeeping,
reporting, and disclosure requirements represented a
means of information gathering essential for detecting
violations of the Act.204
The Court easily sidestepped a broad interpreta-
tion of Talley to render its decision, but it did little to
ameliorate the doctrinal inertia gripping its approach
to regulatory interferences with anonymous speech.
Although the Court concluded that the FECA's
provisions hit the mark where Los Angeles's blun-
derbuss approach
overshot, it articu-
lated no clear prin-
ciple guiding its
speech in McIntyre proved hardly more decision. Why
hasized, the Court (once again) failed to didn't the Court
strike the FECA's
h under the First Amendment. sclse provi-disclosure provi-
sions as overbroad
because as applied to minor party political commit-
tees and candidates they imposed a great burden on
speech 25 while yielding few benefits?
20 6
3. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission:
An Amorphous Right-to-be-Unknown While
Engaging in Electoral Politics? 20 7
The Court's last word about restrictions imposed
on election-related anonymous speech came in
Mclntyre.2 °8 The case presented squarely the issue of
"whether and to what extent the First Amendment's pro-
tection of anonymity encompasses documents intended
to influence the electoral process."20 9 McIntyre had
been fined for distributing anonymous leaflets opposing
a proposed school tax in violation of Ohio Code.210 The
relevant provision required that written communica-
tions aimed at influencing voters in any election must
conspicuously bear the name and address of the person
responsible for the communication.2 1 ' The Court
invalidated the law;2'2 but its decision suffered the same
analytical shortcomings that plagued its earlier encoun-
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ters with interferences with anonymous speech.
The Court-concluded that because Ohio's regulation
interfered with the content of core political speech
it would withstand scrutiny only if it was narrowly
tailored to serve the state's overriding interests.213 The
Court explained that although the regulation applied
evenhandedly to all viewpoints it compelled speech
(i.e., it required disclosure of the speaker's identity)
and operated only against one type of message (i.e.,
it applied only to speech intended to influence elec-
tions).2 14 However, the Court elided the distinction
between Ohio's disclosure law and process-oriented
voting regulations that also burden speech but are
subjected to less searching review. 21 '5 Don't restric-
tions preventing write-in voting216 and campaigning
near polling places 217 similarly interfere with speech?
Thus, while the Court's analysis
has intuitive appeal, it created a T H
material dichotomy without clear
boundaries.218
The Court's "exacting" scru- explicitly embracinj
tiny ultimately proved the kiss analysis as its ana
of death.219 Ohio advanced two
compelling interests to defend its
disclosure provision; both proved to providing a sounc
insufficient to save it. Ohio first future restrictions on
asserted its interest, a l Buckley,
in proyiding the electorate with
vital ihformation. 220 The Court descriptive benefitsi
explained that this "simple" interest and explaining why
was inadequate to warrant forced
disclosure because the decision to
exclude one's name and address
from a communication was no different from other
editorial decisions affecting the communication's con-
tent. 221 Additionally, the Court stated that the extra
information likely added little to a reader's understand-
ing of the message.222 The Court gave greater atten-
tion to Ohio's second interest but found it lacking as
well. The Court acknowledged that Ohio's interest in
preventing fraud and libel during election campaigns
"carries special weight."22' Nevertheless, the Court
concluded that although the regulation complemented
Ohio's prohibition against false speech during elections
by deterring violations and enabling enforcement,
this ancillary function was not sufficiently weighty to
sustain it.2 14 The Court thus struck Ohio's "extremely
broad" regulation because it was not narrowly tailored
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to serve overriding state interests.225
The Court distinguished both Talley and Buckley
on its way to invalidating Ohio's disclosure law. The
Court easily determined that Talley did not control
the outcome of the case under review because Ohio's
regulation restricted only anonymous communications
designed to influence voters, whereas Los Angeles's
ordinance prohibited anonymous handbills under all
circumstances. 2 However, distinguishing Buckley
proved a more substantial challenge for the Court. The
Court forced an intellectual wedge between Buckley
and McIntyre by conceptualizing a speech hierarchy
to demonstrate that Buckley's disclosure provisions
were less intrusive than those involved in McIntyre.
227
The Court acknowledged that money indeed talks;
but explained that it did so in a less personal, specific,
and provocative way than written
urt can vitalize its atrophied communications.228 Therefore, the
onymous speech doctrine by Court reasoned that while the regu-
lations of each case required com-
the time, place, or manner parable disclosures, Buckley speak-
ytical frame for assessing ers were required to reveal much
onymous speech. In addition less information than theirMcIntyre
counterparts. 229 The Court further
methodology for evaluating distinguished McIntyre by observing
anonymous speech, adopting that Buckley's disclosure provisions
were limited to candidate electionsnanner analysis trucks the
and served the additional compel-
frationalizing its precedents ling interest of preventing corrup-
he Court has had a difficult tion and its appearance.230 Thus
when juxtaposed, Ohio's restric-
tion more severely interfered with
speech and advanced less substan-
tial policy objectives than those involved in Buck-
ley 2
3
Unfortunately, the Court's last encounter with
a restriction interfering with anonymous speech in
McIntyre proved hardly more instructive than its first
more than thirty years earlier. As the dissent empha-
sized, the Court (once again) failed to establish a clear
legal rule to govern its protection of anonymous speech
under the First Amendment.232 Especially troubling
was the Court's treatment of its precedents in this arena.
The Court acknowledged Talley's slender holding,
but nevertheless embraced its expansive rhetoric.
2 33
The McIntyre Court agreed that anonymous speech
"exemplifies the purpose behind.., the First Amend-







was no less enigmatic. The Court explained that
Buckley remained good law; it still permitted narrowly
tailored interferences with anonymous speech to serve
overriding state interests.235 But how does disclosing a
large contribution to the Socialist Labor Party23 6 reveal
less personal, specific, and provocative information
than handing out leaflets bearing the message,237 Our
children's education and welfare must come first! We must stop
wasting taxpayers'nioney?238 How is revealing one's name,
address, occupation, and principle place of business in
reports for public inspection and copying less onerous
than including one's name and address on a written
communication? 239 And didn't Ohio assertthe same
compelling interest to vindicate its regulation that
the Buckley Court primarily relied on to uphold the
FECA's disclosure provisions? 240 These seem crucial
questions for predicting what type of interferences with
anonymous speech would pass constitutional muster.
Yet the McIntyre Court failed to give us the requisite
conceptual tools for answering them.
B. The Inadvertent Interference Methodology
It is late in the day to argue that the First Amendment
does not afford anonymous speech any protection.241
The Supreme Court has protected the right to speak
incognito in some circumstances, some of the time.
But it has failed to offer us a principled explanation for
the cases' divergent outcomes. Although the outcomes
seem intuitive thus far, predicting the next one nears
conjecture. Meanwhile, the Court has at its disposal
a coherent and sophisticated analytical framework for
addressing the same kind of inadvertent interferences
with free expression in other contexts.242 The Court's
approach to regulations infringing on the time, place,
or manner of expression represents a way for the Court
to bring clarity to its muddled anonymous speech
jurisprudence. The time, place, or manner analysis
rationalizes its anonymous speech precedents and
provides a conceptual methodology for evaluating
similar regulatory interferences in the future.
The Court's approach to regulations restricting the
time, place, or manner of expression was born out of
the recognition that legitimate uses of governmental
police powers would, at times, directly interfere with
free expression.243 Archetypal cases have involved
restrictions aimed at reducing unwelcome noise,2 44
preventing visual blight,2 45 and facilitating pedestrian
movement. 246 These general health, welfare, and safety
regulations were clearly aimed at interfering with com-
municative activities.2 47 But the Court realized that the
lawmakers' objectives were to redress byproducts of
the expressions distinct from their messages.2 48 Such
inadvertent interferences with free expression thus did
not engender the sort of conceptual problem that the
First Amendment traditionally solves: governmental
meddling in the marketplace of ideas to advance or
impede certain viewpoints. 2 49 Nevertheless, seemingly
benign health, welfare, and safety regulations could be
deployed to suffocate expression by restricting the uses
of available media. 25" Additionally, lawmakers may
inadvertently craft regulations that achieve negligible
health, welfare, and safety benefits vis- -vis the burdens
imposed on free expression. 5
The time, place, or manner analysis252 thus devel-
oped as a bellwether to guide the Court in separat-
ing legitimate uses of governmental police powers
necessarily interfering with speech from those that
either operate to censor expression or impose costs
on speech disproportional to the resultant social ben-
efits.253 Inadvertent interferences with speech are valid
if the regulation is (1) justified without reference to
the content of the regulated expression; (2) narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest;
and (3) leaves open adequate alternative channels for
communication of the idea. 5
The first criterion serves the prerequisite function
of smoking out deliberate interferences with speech.255
A regulation impacting all viewpoints across-the-board
as a consequence of the legislature's non-speech health,
welfare, and safety objective is viewed as truly inad-
vertent because it is content-neutral.25 ' The regulation's
consequences for various speech modes and viewpoints
were not factored into the legislative equation.257 But a
regulation impacting different viewpoints differently is
viewed by the Court as content-based and invalidated
under the reasoning traditionally applied to deliberate
governmental attempts to promote or hinder the dis-
semination of certain messages. 258 However, because
legal tests are inherently manipulable there is an ever-
present danger that deliberate interferences with speech
may be smuggled into the time, place, or manner analy-
sis under the guise of content-neutral regulations.259
The second and third elements of the time, place, or
manner analysis are the operative core of the Court's
approach to inadvertent interferences with expres-
sion. 260 The second criterion contains two discrete
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requirements and represents a formula for assessing the
importance of the government's interest in regulating
non-speech components of a communicative activity.
261
The regulation must pursue a significant governmental
objective and in a manner narrowly tailored 262 to
achieving that objective, without burdening more
speech than is necessary. 26' Thus the second criterion
requires a subjective valuation of the significance of
the objective itself and an appraisal of the importance
of the particular means taken to achieve it in light of
available alternatives and their concomitant impacts
on expression.264
The third criterion serves to assess the extent of
the inadvertent interference with expression from
the speaker's perspective.2 6' This inquiry involves
two components, one explicit and one (oftentimes)
implicit. 266 The first half of this inquiry requires an
evaluation of adequate alternative means for the speaker
to deliver her message.2 67 The speaker's ability to
access adequate alternative modes for communicating
her message levers her speech interest in the activity
downward, and vice versa. 268 The implicit half of this
inquiry involves an evaluation of the importance of
the speaker's message itself. 269 To the extent that the
speech is low-grade27 ° as opposed to core political,27'
greater inadvertent interferences are tolerable. 72
C. Applying the Inadvertent Interference Method-
ology to the Court's Anonymous Speech Cases
From its first run-in with a regulatory interference with
anonymous speech in Talley to its last in McIntyre, the
Court has struggled to formulate a coherent approach
that reflects the requisite balance of conflicting con-
stitutional policies 273 inherent in an assessment of any
such restriction. This struggle for equilibrium has
resulted in poorly reasoned precedents that, on their
face, appear inconsistent. But this persistent struggle
can be resolved by recourse to a preexisting methodol-
ogy deployed by the Court in similar cases. The
Court can vitalize its atrophied anonymous speech
doctrine by explicitly embracing the time, place, or
manner analysis as its analytical frame for assessing
interferences with anonymous speech. In addition to
providing a sound methodology for evaluating future
restrictions on anonymous speech, adopting the time,
place, or manner analysis trucks the descriptive benefits
of rationalizing its precedents and explaining why the
Court has had a difficult time deciding these cases.
Deploying the time, place, or manner analysis in
cases involving interferences with anonymous speech,
the Court should first ask whether the regulation can
be justified without reference to the content of the
regulated expression. This question is basic to any
analysis of interferences with speech under the First
Amendment, but has proven particularly bedeviling
for the Court in the context of regulations curbing
anonymous speech. The time, place, or manner analysis
resolves this problem by providing the appropriate
conceptual lens for evaluating these types of interfer-
ences. Disclosure regulations are the same type of
content-neutral health, welfare, and safety regula-
tions inadvertently interfering with expression that
the time, place, or manner analysis was developed
to address.274 Because such restrictions impact all
viewpoints equally-the government is not attempting
to advance its speech preferences-they are content-
neutral, and thus, truly inadvertent interferences with
expression. Disclosure is required to achieve regulatory
objectives (e.g., deterring fraud and libel and educat-
ing the electorate) distinct from the communications'
intended messages.
The Court has had trouble conceptualizing restric-
tions on anonymous speech in this way for two reasons.
First, unlike other time, place, or manner restrictions on
expression, the feature of the message disclosure laws
regulate is more obviously part of the message. General
health, welfare, and safety regulations restricting the
use of sound trucks,275 prohibiting the destruction of
draft cards, 276 and restricting proselytizing activity
at county fairs to fixed locations 277 clearly impair not
only the modes of expression used but the messages
themselves (i.e., to a certain extent, the medium is
always part of the message). 278 But the Court has had a
difficult time understanding that requiring disclosure of
one's identity on election-related materials is similarly
a general health, welfare, and safety restriction on the
time, place, or manner of expression that implicates
both the expression's form and content. 279 Secondly,
and related to the first, the Court has mistakenly280
viewed restrictions on anonymous speech as having the
effect of compelling speech.28 ' The Court has failed
to understand that time, place, or manner restrictions
always require speakers to communicate in prescribed
and dispreferred manners.
282
The Court's misperception of disclosure provi-
sions' interference with speech has had the immediate
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consequence of subjecting such inadvertent regulatory
interferences to a heightened review standard that
has usually proven fatal. The greater repercussion,
however, is that the Court has distorted the process of
balancing the conflicting constitutional policies283 that
review of such disclosure provisions demands. Thus,
while the Court has afforded speakers unprecedented
protection from inadvertent interferences with their
speech, the government's ability to use its police powers
to enact viable health, welfare, and safety regulations
to redress the social ills disclosure provisions cure has
been made commensurately more difficult. The first
prong of the time, place, or manner analysis therefore
serves not only as a means of better conceptualizing the
nature of the interference with speech. It also allows
the Court to more accurately balance the opposing
constitutional policy concerns28 raised by disclosure
provisions.
The next step in assessing a restriction on anony-
mous speech should involve an explicit application of
the balancing test that represents the operative core
of the time, place, or manner analysis. The Court
should make an assessment of the significance of the
governmental objective(s) advanced by the restric-
tion in light of available regulatory alternatives less
intrusive on (anonymous) speech. The results of this
inquiry should then be placed against an assessment of
the significance of the restriction from the speaker's
perspective. The Court should assess the availability
of adequate alternative (i.e., non-anonymous) chan-
nels for communication of the speaker's idea and the
significance of the idea itself. The relative weight of the
products from these two assessments should ultimately
guide the Court in determining the constitutionality of
any given restriction on anonymous speech.
Indeed, aspects of this balancing process appear
firmly, if inarticulately, established in the Court's anony-
mous speech cases. 285 But by explicitly reformulating
the Court's analysis in accordance with this test, the
cases' outcomes appear consistent and governed by a
clear principle. Additionally, this reconceptualization
of the Court's analytical approach serves to largely
explain why these have been tough cases and, by
extension, why the Court has had difficulty articulating
the reasons dictating their outcomes.286 It becomes
clear that unlike traditional time, place, or manner
restrictions there is a perverse symmetry between
the government's interest in the particular means of
achieving its objective and the speaker's interest in that
means for communicating her message.287
Despite the Talley Court's approbation of anonymous
speech as such,288 the case's outcome appears governed
by at least one of the factors involved in the time, place,
or manner analysis. The Court implicitly recognized
Los Angeles's interest in curbing fraud, false advertis-
ing, and libel as significant by refusing to pass on the
validity of a restriction limited to redressing those
evils. 289 However, the sweeping ordinance was clearly
not narrowly tailored to serve those legitimate objec-
tives. The Court recognized that barring anonymous
speech "in any place under any circumstance" 290 was a
relatively unimportant means of preventing fraud, false
advertising, or libel given that a more circumscribed
ordinance would have served the government's objec-
tives equally well with less intrusion on free expres-
sion.29 ' Also, the Court understood that placed against
this slight interest was Talley's more substantial interest
in communicating anonymously. 292 From this perspec-
tive, the Court's rhetoric lauding anonymous speech
appears part of a larger assessment of Talley's speech
interest in the restricted activity.
But notice that once put in time, place, or manner
terms, Talley's speech interest is counterintuitively
correlated to the government's regulatory interest.
293
The veil of anonymity becomes more significant, and
alternative channels of communicating become inad-
THI Sperverse correlation between the impor-
T Htance of the speaker's interest and the
government's interest in restrictions on anonymous speech has
stymied the Court's attempt to develop a sound conceptual
approach to interferences with anonymous speech.
equate, as the speaker's expression approaches fraud,
false advertising, or libel.194 Thus as alternative chan-
nels become inadequate for the speaker to communi-
cate her message, the government's interest in restrict-
ing anonymous speech becomes more significant.295
The Court seems to obscure this reality by its dog-
matic insistence that adequate alternatives to anony-
mous speech do not exist for those fearing reprisal for
unpopular speech.296 This reasoning rings especially
hollow 297 as applied to Talley 298 because, after all,
does a protestor fearing retaliation personally hand
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out leaflets while simultaneously attempting to enlist
passersby in his organization? 299 This perverse cor-
relation between the importance of the speaker's inter-
U explicit reconceptualization of this balancing process
TH-the time, place, or manner framework also suggest
to the post-McIntyre question of whether any disclosure provisior
should survive constitutional scrutiny. Despite the Court's celebration a
speech as a talisman against repression of ideas, the Court has (les
determined that restrictions can be imposed on such expression when the
balance is struck.
est and the government's interest in restrictions on
anonymous speech has stymied the Court's attempt to
develop a sound conceptual approach to interferences
with anonymous speech. The problem pervades the
Court's anonymous speech cases, manifesting itself in
the Court's insistence that anonymous speech itself
serves instrumental ends.3"' However, the time, place,
or manner balancing test represents a means of resolving
this problem by providing the appropriate conceptual
structure for weighing the competing but interrelated
interests of the speaker and the government.0 '
Although cloaked in exacting scrutiny rhetoric,
30 2
the Court's assessment of the FECA's disclosure provi-
sions also appears guided by the time, place, or manner
balancing test. The Buckley Court approved of the
government's substantial interest in enhancing the
information base of the electorate; preventing cor-
ruption and its appearance, and enabling enforce-
ment of the FECA's other requirements. 0 3 Unlike
in Talley the Buckley Court also concluded that the
disclosure provisions were narrowly tailored to advance
the government's significant interests. The Court
determined that the provisions requiring disclosure of
financial contributions and expenditures were a crucial
means of "opening the basic processes of our federal
election system to public view"3 °4 and that this interest
would not be as well served by an alternative means less
intrusive on speech.305 In weighing the government's
interest in the FECA's regulation against the speakers'
interests in the restricted activity, the Court appreciated
that the disclosure provisions significantly impacted
core political speech. 30 6 The Court recognized that the
restriction would, in a worst-case scenario, effectively
foreclose a channel of communication for some speak-
ers.3"7 Nevertheless, on balance, the Court concluded
that the importance of the disclosure provisions for
advancing the government's objectives
outweighed the speakers' interests in non-
in terms of disclosure.308
s an answer Lastly, understanding the Court's
would and approach in McIntyre as an implicit appli-
cation of the time, place, or manner
fanonymous analysis resolves the tension between
s eloquently) the Court's ostensible reasoning and the
appropriate holding of Buckley. The McIntyre Court
acknowledged the significance of Ohio's
interest in preventing fraud and libel.309
But in a marked departure from the rea-
soning upholding the FECA's disclosure requirements,
the Court rejected the state's interest in educating its
electorate as "simple."310 At first blush, it appears impos-
sible to square this conclusion with the opposite one
reached in Buckley 3 ' On closer inspection, however,
this unexplained difference appears reconcilable by
focusing on the latter part of the inquiry used to assess
the government's relative interest in the regulation.3"
The McIntyre Court did not discount Ohio's interest
in providing the electorate with relevant information
upon an abstract subjective valuation of that interest.313
Rather, the Court's assessment of Ohio's interest appears
tempered by its appreciation of the sweeping scope
of the restriction.1 4
The Court again verbally formulated its scrutiny as
"exacting,"3 5 but appears to have invalidated Ohio's
restriction under the time, place, or manner balancing
test.316 Although Ohio attempted to save its restriction
with rationales gleaned from Buckley317 the regulation
was actually more like the sweeping ordinance involved
in Talley 318 The Court thus rightly concluded that
restricting anonymous speech in all election contexts
319
represented a relatively unimportant means of serving
the state's asserted interests vis-a-vis available alterna-
tives less intrusive on speech.320 In contrast to Buck-
ley 32' the speaker's interest in the restricted activity
322
outweighed the importance of the regulation to Ohio
as a means of advancing its legitimate objectives.323
Importantly, explicitly reformulating the Court's
reasoning in McIntyre in time, place, or manner terms,
gives substance to the Court's mollifying dicta about
the constitutionality of more limited disclosure provi-
sions324 or those operating in "larger circumstances."
325
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The McIntyre Court's dicta suggest (albeit inarticulately)
the weighing of interests involved when the government
interferes with speech to pursue legitimate non-speech
objectives." 6 The Court is thus telling us that disclo-
sure provisions cannot survive constitutional scrutiny
when the balance between the speakers' interests in
the restricted activity and the government's interest
in that means of achieving legitimate objectives tips
toward the speakers.
Therefore, the conceptual methodology that the
Court has devised to assess restrictions on the time,
place, or manner of expression when applied to the
Court's anonymous speech cases harmonizes their
outcomes by demonstrating that at an intuitive level
they were all decided according to the same balanc-
ing process. The explicit reconceptualization of this
balancing process in terms of the time, place, or manner
framework also suggests an answer to the post-Mcintyre
question of whether any disclosure provision would
and should survive constitutional scrutiny.327 Despite
the Court's celebration of anonymous speech as a
talisman against repression of ideas, 328 the Court has
(less eloquently) determined that restrictions can be
imposed on such expression when the appropriate
balance is struck. The time, place, or manner approach
structures the Court's intuitive balancing process in
terms of an established conceptual framework and
one that has worked wel3 29 in analogous circum-
stances.
330
V. Bringing the FECA's Identification
Requirement Online
Can the government restrict anonymous election-
related communications in online discussion fora consis-
tent with the First Amendment? There has indeed been
considerable hand wringing over the constitutional-
ity of any election-related disclosure provision since
McIntyre was handed down.33' And the situation no
doubt appears more bleak when considering a disclosure
provision in the context of a medium 332 steeped in an
antigovernment mythology of inherent unregulabil-
ity.333 When analyzed according to the methodology
proposed above,334 however, it seems that a provision
modeled on 335 section 441d restricting anonymous
election-related communications in Internet discussion
fora should pass constitutional muster.
Evaluation of a restriction on online election-related
anonymous speech under the initial prong of the time,
place, or manner analysis336 should result in the regula-
tion being understood as an inadvertent interference
with expression. Like section 441d, 337 such a restriction
should be considered content-neutral because it would
necessarily impact all viewpoints equally in order to
serve the government's non-speech health, welfare, and
safety objective(s). 3 8 Disclosure would principally be
required to advance the same non-speech governmental
interest in preserving the integrity of our electoral
process as its offline analogue.339 Thus the regulation
should be justified without reference to the content
of the regulated expression and its constitutionality
should be resolved according to the balance of interests
demanded by the operative core of the time, place, or
manner methodology. 340
Application of the time, place, or manner balanc-
ing test 341 suggests that the government's interest in
a regulation restricting online anonymous election-
related speech should outweigh the speakers' interests
in the regulated expression. An explicit assessment of
the importance of the regulation from the government's
perspective should confirm that the regulation advances
a significant governmental interest in a narrowly tai-
lored manner. In past cases the Court has consistently
recognized that the interests served by disclosure
provisions are significant. 342 The interest in preserving
rational electoral outcomes by curbing dirty tricks
perpetrated via the Internet 343 should likewise be viewed
as significant.
The trickier question is whether such a regulation
should be considered narrowly tailored to advancing
the government's interest. 344 A restriction modeled
on section 441d should avoid the fate of the sweeping
regulations stricken in Talley and McIntyre3 4' because it
implicates a sufficiently narrow class of election-related
communications. 3 46 Additionally, the very extent and
magnitude of possible harms to our electoral process
facilitated by Internet discussion fora347 should align
such a regulation with those held to be constitutional
in Buckley3 48 and those operating in "larger contexts"
alluded to in McIntyre.349 A regulation of online anony-
mous election-related speech should therefore be rec-
ognized as an important means (in light of regulatory
alternatives less intrusive on anonymous speech) for
the government to obtain its significant objective.
Set against the government's weighty interest in a
regulation restricting online anonymous election-related
speech is the speakers' less substantial interests in the
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restricted expression.3 50 There is no doubt but that the
speech interfered with by the regulation is important: 
351
core political speech sits atop the hierarchy of speech
protected by the First Amendment.352 Nonetheless,
the speakers' interests in the restricted expression is
ratcheted downward by the availability of adequate
alternative (i.e., non-anonymous) channels for com-
munication of their ideas.3 53 The restriction imposed
on anonymous election-related speech in online discus-
sion fora interferes only with the manner in which
ideas are conveyed using one channel of one particular
medium. 5 4 It should furthermore be remembered that
a given speaker's interest in anonymous communication
increases in lockstep with the government's interest
in restricting the use of that manner of communica-
tion.
355
On balance, it thus seems that the government's
interest in a regulation restricting anonymous election-
related speech in Internet discussion fora should out-
weigh the speakers' competing interests in the regulated
expression. Therefore, under the time, place, or manner
analysis such a regulation should be upheld.
VI. Conclusion
That the Internet is the most democratic mass com-
munications medium yet devised has become a truism.
It should come, then, as no surprise that it is profoundly
reshaping the manner, as well as the terrain, in which
American politics is practiced. The Internet provides
ordinary citizens unprecedented ways to speak, and
our government equally new ways to listen.
This collision of the online world with our politi-
cal one is raising some challenging questions for the
FEC and legislators. 'How does (or should) existing
federal election law apply to campaigning activity in
cyberspace? A more provocative inquiry, however,
looms behind this immediate question and should
inform its resolution. It is an inquiry that cuts to the
core of how we govern ourselves: How do we secure
the promise held out by the Internet of greater, broader
participation in our electoral process while simultane-
ously ensuring that it is meaningful.
WERNER III
This Note has addressed an aspect of this larger
inquiry in the context of one provision of the FECA. It
has argued that Internet communications, particularly
those occurring in online discussion fora, should be
subject to a regulation modeled on section 441d. The
same species of dirty tricks guarded against by section
441d are not only possible online. In the absence of such
a restriction, they are inevitable. The online methods
of stock market manipulations and business consulting
firms point the way to the kind of dirty tricks that we
should expect (and, indeed, are beginning to find) from
unscrupulous and unconstrained electioneers.
This Note has further argued that, if enacted, such
a restriction should survive constitutional review. The
Court's ostensible approach to restrictions on anony-
mous speech has resulted in decisions that appear
unprincipled and wildly inconsistent. In view of this
doctrinal quagmire, this Note has forcefully argued
that the Court should explicitly adopt as its approach
to regulations impinging on anonymous speech the
sound conceptual methodology that it has devised to
resolve similar cases. On close inspection, it becomes
clear that the Court's anonymous speech decisions have
been informed, at least implicitly, by this methodology.
And when analyzed according to this methodology,
a restriction on online anonymous election-related
speech modeled on section 441d should withstand a
First Amendment challenge.
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